

18 October 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Comparison of Indochina NIEs/SNIEs with DCI Statements  
Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee

1. According to Mr. Maury's office, the Director of Central Intelligence has appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or components thereof and discussed Indochina matters 15 times between 26 January 1959 and 5 May 1971. (One of these appearances was a double session on 25 and 28 February 1966; if you count this as two appearances, the total number is 16.) Mr. Maury's office has furnished us with the transcripts of the DCI's testimony or copies of his prepared statement as indicated on Attachment 2 to this memorandum. So far as we can ascertain, these transcripts are complete with one exception: the transcript for the 26 February 1969 briefing has a statement clipped to the inside of the front cover which says that "pages 60-65 and page 7-A of the transcript have been removed and are being retained in the files of the Committee on Foreign Relations."

25X6

Pages 60-65 occur in the middle of an Indochina discussion and hence may be relevant, though without seeing them we cannot be absolutely sure.

2. My colleagues have reviewed both the transcripts and the output of NIEs and SNIEs comparing each against the other. Their findings are outlined in [ ] attached memorandum (Attachment 1). In essence what you or your predecessors told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or its components was in substantial accord with the judgments extant in the National Intelligence Estimates current with the time these briefings were given. There is one exception to this generalization which is explained in the attached memorandum.

25X1A

3. From the standpoint of consistency, no harm can be done if Senator Fulbright's request were answered by giving him back the record of what you or your predecessors said before his Committee instead of giving him the estimates he requested. This may be the best gambit with which to counter his request, at least in the first instance. There is one briefing, however, which you might want to consider for purposes of image if not of accuracy; namely, Admiral Raborn's 28 February 1966 comments, some of which were, to put it charitably, unprofessional.

4. We will retain the estimates and the material provided by Mr. Maury's office until this matter is resolved or you direct otherwise.

[Redacted Signature]

George A. Carver, Jr.  
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

25X1A

Attachments

cc: Ex. Dir. -Compt. ✓  
Legislative Counsel  
D/ONE

SECRET

18 October 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: George A. Carver. Jr., SAVA

SUBJECT : ONE Review of CIA Briefings on Indochina for  
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1959-71

1. With a single exception, the various statements and transcripts are generally consistent in content and tone with the numerous SNIEs and NIEs prepared during the 1959-71 period.

2. The exception is not a clearcut case but the differences may be significant to the Director. In brief: During the March 13, 1970 briefing on Laos -- which ranged over related subjects as well -- Senator Javits asked the Director if the Agency had "made an estimate of the consequences of the withdrawal" (of US combat forces from South Vietnam). The Director's response, though qualified somewhat, was in the negative. (See pp. 61-62 of the official transcript.) In our review of related estimates, we found that SNIE 14.3-70 ("The Outlook from Hanoi: Factors Affecting North Vietnam's Policy on the War in Vietnam") dated 5 February 1970 -- or a month before the briefing in question -- did discuss at some length the policy of Vietnamization and its likely impact on Hanoi's thinking. (See pp. 2-3, 7-10, and 18 of Estimate.)

3. Some other comments which might be of use to you:

a. Of the testimony prior to 1968, there is very little of value on Indochina for the Committee Staff to explore. Exceptions are the 10 October 1963 transcript on the situation in South Vietnam just prior to Diem's removal (which accords well with Estimates of the period, but is hardly meaty enough for appetites whetted by the "Pentagon Papers"); and the 28 February 1966 transcript -- or at least the portion on communist use of Cambodian soil.

GROUP I


Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

SECRET

SECRET

b. On the other hand, there is much of value in the testimony offered since the beginning of 1968, except for the most recent 15 May 1971 transcript which contains little on the Indochinese problem.

c. I assume that the Committee Staff could supplement all this material with its own voluminous proceedings (published and unpublished) of October and November 1969 on Thailand and Laos, and other, more recent, testimony on the war.



Chief, ONE/FE

25X1A

-2-

SECRET

26 January 1959 -- Prepared statement

18 January 1960 -- Prepared Statement

2 May 1961 -- Transcript

6 March 1962 -- Transcript

10 October 1963 -- Transcript

26 January 1965 -- Transcript

25 & 28 February 1966 -- Transcript

3 February 1967 -- Transcript

23 January 1968 -- Prepared Statement & Transcript

26 February 1969 -- Transcript

28 October 1969 -- Transcript

13 March 1970 -- Transcript

7 July 1970 -- Transcript

23 March 1971 -- Transcript

5 May 1971 - Transcript

25X6

25X6